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On Criticism as Value-Judgement 
P N. Furbank 
AS CAN BE IMAGINED, it was a thrill for me to be rung by Professor 
Frank Conroy with the news that my biography of Diderot had won the 
Truman Capote Award for Literary Criticism. It was also quite a surprise, 
since up till now the book has not been exactly what you would call a best 
seller. The trouble is, partly, that Diderot is one of those figures about whom 
people feel, guiltily, that they ought to know more than they do?or that 
they know a lot, if only they could manage to bring it to mind. When his 
name comes up in conversation, a hunted look comes over people's faces. 
Now, there is a good reason for this, and it is largely the result of Diderot's 
very queer publishing history, the works we are most likely to value him for 
now having been, quite simply, unpublished and unknown during his life 
time. Thus I would not think of blaming people for a certain blankness on 
the subject. Though on the other hand, I do feel they are missing some 
thing. 
So much for Diderot. Since the Capote Award is for a work of literary 
criticism, I ought, in the course of thanking the Writers'Workshop and the 
judges, to say something on the subject of criticism in general. I shall not 
pretend that I do not have views on the subject; I have decided to make it 
an excuse to state my basic ideas on art and criticism, or in other words to 
expound my theory of aesthetics. I am afraid it may all be rather dry, and I 
just hope you will forgive this. 
I would begin by positing that literature, music and the plastic arts are at 
bottom the same kind of thing. This seems reasonable, if for no other rea 
son than that there seems to be a lot in common between the careers of a 
Wordsworth, a Rembrandt or a Beethoven, and about the sort of achieve 
ment they seem to be pursuing. But granting this?if you do?a large con 
sequence follows. For what seems to be true about all the arts, but comes 
home to one most obviously in the case of music, is that the arts are all 
about value. Art has, essentially, no other raison d'?tre than to be intrinsi 
cally valuable. I am exaggerating a little, of course. For a long time, Western 
art was in the service of the Church and therefore could be said to have had 
a utilitarian function. Still, if we consider a secular work of music, shall we 
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say a string quartet by Haydn, what other raison d'etre could it be said to 
have than to be good, to be intrinsically valuable? There is nothing much, 
after all, that you could use it for. 
The point is really obvious, but it becomes less so when one thinks of 
literature; for, unlike music, literature employs a medium?words and sen 
tences?which have all sorts of utilitarian uses as well as their artistic one. 
Literature, unlike music, seems to be committed to meaning, as indeed does 
painting?or at any rate representational painting. It is here that we need to 
cling on to the example of music and to the identity of the arts. 
I stick to my point, that the raison d'etre of literature is not to have mean 
ing but to be valuable. The way that writers and composers speak or be 
have, and a study of their manuscripts, tends to support me. So often, the 
language that they speak is about discovering things?discovering them rather 
than intending them, or finding the way to express something. It is as if they 
were concerned with finding things?valuable combinations of thoughts or 
words or harmonies that have lain about for all eternity to be discovered. 
Art, viewed from this point of view, is a supremely empirical activity. 
But if this is so, then this surely says something important about criti 
cism. For if the arts only exist to be intrinsically (and not just instrumen 
tally) valuable?if the sole mode of being of a poem or a quartet is to be 
valuable?then it must surely follow that the essential function of criticism 
in the arts is value-judgement. I think why discussions of literary criticism 
often go wrong is because critics want to compromise over this issue. There 
is a very strong school of opinion which says that value-judgement has no 
place at all in literary criticism. Pierre Macherey writes that "the literary 
work must be elaborated and used, for without this it will never become an 
object of knowledge," but "it must also be left as it is, if we are to achieve a 
theoretical judgement and avoid value-judgements." Stanley Fish, likewise, 
explains that his method "is oriented away from evaluation and towards de 
scription," and Paul de Man speaks of evaluation, dismissively, as "the most 
naive" form of criticism. 
Now Stanley Fish, at least, strikes me as a wonderfully talented critic, 
with an extraordinary ability, when writing about Milton, to improve our 
sense of what Milton's verse is, what sort ofthing it is, what cunning arti 
fices and strategies are at work in it. He has also written, very funnily, 
about 
"Why literary criticism is like virtue"?that is to say why criticism is 
its own reward and should look for no other. Still, as a matter of logic, one 
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asks oneself why is it so important to orient oneself away from evaluation? 
The point is, when Fish is helping us to see what is there in a certain pas 
sage in Milton, he is also tacitly, by the same act, making us see it as good. In 
criticism of the arts, evaluation is going on all the time, though for the 
most part silently. Eliot once said, in answer to those who attacked criti 
cism, that we cannot stop criticising?by which I think he meant value 
judgement?for it is as instinctive as breathing; hence the only choice open 
to us is between bad criticism and good. 
Let it be remembered, too, that for ninety percent of his or her day, a 
writer or a composer is engaged, not in creation but in criticism?in re 
jecting a certain phrase or epithet or modulation in favour of another and 
better one. This is criticism as value-judgement, if ever there was such a 
thing; and what of course it brings home to us is how artificial the distinc 
tion between criticism, or a certain kind of criticism, and creation really is. 
The choice for the theorist, thus, seems to be either to hold that value 
judgement has no rightful place at all in criticism, and in so far as it tries to 
creep in, it should be severely repressed as a naivety and a distraction. Or, 
on the other hand to hold, as I do, that, directly or indirectly, criticism is all 
about value-judgement and about nothing else. Either are respectable posi 
tions. What is not respectable, and is a fatal creator of muddle and bad faith, 
is to hold that value-judgement is just a part of a critic's duty?perhaps 
something he does in his more relaxed moments, or for private consump 
tion only, and always with a humble proviso that "Of course this is only my 
personal opinion." 
The clue to why this issue still puzzles us is that, as I have said, critical 
evaluation tends for the most part to have to take place silently. It is here 
that Wittgenstein is so helpful. "It is remarkable," he writes, "that in real 
life, when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beau 
tiful,"fine,' etc., play hardly any role at all. . . .The words you use are more 
akin to 
'right' and 'correct.'" And again, "We think we have to talk about 
aesthetic judgements like 'This is beautiful,' but we find that if we have to 
talk about aesthetic judgements we don't find these words at all, but a word 
used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity." 
"A word used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated ac 
tivity": this to my mind exactly describes what is happening in genuinely 
good criticism. T. S. Eliot once argued, in a famous essay, that Marlowe's 
Jew of Malta was best seen not as a tragedy, but as a savage farce. This was a 
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brilliant stroke of criticism, enabling us to see Marlowe's play more clearly 
for what it is?what sort ofthing it is?and simultaneously to see it as good, 
and yet without employing any epithet of praise. 
This is how much of the best criticism works. But do not let us be misled 
by it. Because Eliot's remark happens to turn a key in the lock for this 
particular play, we must not try to convert it into a rule or a generalisation, 
or start thinking there must be other plays lying around that only need to 
be seen as savage farces to be found good. (Of course there may be, but that 
is hardly to the point.) Knowing Marlowe's play, we feel Eliot's observation 
to have worked in this instance in a marvellous fashion, but the effect is not 
repeatable. 
To generalise, a good critic has a superior instinct for the good in art, 
but the device he finds for alerting us to this good will never be what it 
seems. It may sound like something generalisable, but this will be an illu 
sion. The reason he gives for a judgement can never be more than a pseudo 
reason. And to the question, "Yes, I see what you are pointing out, but why 
would that make it good?" there can never be an answer. 
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